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DEFENDING WOMEN 
Susan Estrich * 
JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATIERED WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE AND 
THE LA w. By Cynthia Gillespie. Columbus: Ohio State University 
Press. 1989. Pp. xiii, 252. $24.95. 
Justifiable Homicide, by Cynthia Gillespie, a Seattle attorney and 
founder of the Northwest Women's Law Center, presents a chilling 
portrait of the lives of women who are beaten by their husbands. 
Through Gillespie's case studies, we meet women such as Caroline 
Mae Scott, whose husband beat her with his fists, his gun, belts, 
broomhandles, coathangers, and extension cords, and threw her down 
a flight of stairs when she was pregnant. 1 We meet Delores Churchill, 
whose husband, a police officer, aimed a gun at her head and subjected 
her to forced prostitution (p. 14). We are introduced to women of all 
races and ages who are kidnapped by their husbands, raped by them, 
and threatened by them; women who see not only their own lives, but 
those of their children, destroyed by abusive spouses. 
But Gillespie's focus is not so much on the victimization of these 
women by their husbands as by the legal system. Gillespie focuses on 
cases in which the women, ultimately, were not passive victims. In-
stead, these women responded not only with violence, but with greater 
violence. These are cases in which abused women killed their hus-
bands, are tried for murder, and plead self-defense. And mostly, they 
fail.2 
• Robert Kingsley Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Southern Califor-
nia. B.A. 1974, Wellesley College; J.D. 1977, Harvard. - Ed. My thanks to Shawn Boyne, 
University of Southern California Class of 1991, for her research assistance. 
1. P. 2. Beatings during pregnancy are, according to both Gillespie and other studies, quite 
common. P. 52. See L. OKUN, WOMEN ABUSE: FACTS REPLACING MYTHS 237 (1986) (62% 
of women from a shelter sample were beaten during pregnancy); Helton, Mcfarlane & Ander-
son, Battered and Pregnant: A Prevalence Study, 11 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1337, 1337-39 (1987) 
(finding that 23% of a random clinic sample of pregnant women had been physically battered 
before or during pregnancy, and that "[t]he primary predictor of battering during pregnancy was 
prior abuse; 87.5% of the women battered during current pregnancy were physically abused 
prior to pregnancy"). 
2. Gillespie's cases are drawn primarily from appellate decisions. While such cases obviously 
shed light on the attitude of the legal system toward battered women, appellate cases in the 
criminal justice system are only the tip of the iceberg. Gillespie does not say what percentage of 
the women who kill abusive husbands are arrested, charged, and indicted in the first instance; 
what percent plea bargain and what kinds of bargains they receive; and what percent are acquit-
ted at trial. As a result, it is difficult to place the cases she does study in any sort of appropriate 
context; an outrage is surely still an outrage, but it does matter, at least to those interested in 
reforming the system, whether it is the exception or the rule. Moreover, when one examines the 
footnotes, it emerges that some of her cases date back 20 or 30 years, or more, see, e.g., pp. 53 
1430 
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They fail, in Gillespie's view, because the law of self-defense was 
written by men, for men. The requirements of that law, she argues, 
however appropriate in cases of fights between men, are unjust when 
applied to women who are abused by their husbands. Her position 
seems to be that the rules should be abandoned for battered women, 
with the hoped-for result that battered women will be acquitted when 
they murder abusive men. 
At this point, the book begins to raise serious questions in my 
mind. The rules which Gillespie attacks do not exist, at least in the 
first instance, to torment battered wives. Unlike, say, the resistance 
requirement in rape law, they are not born from a historic distrust of 
women, or a desire to keep them powerless. They exist, quite simply, 
to preserve human life where deadly force is not reasonably necessary. 
These rules can be simply stated, even if they are not always so 
simply applied. As every first-year law student learns, one is justified 
in using deadly force in self-defense only in response to a threat of 
death or serious bodily harm; only if the danger is "imminent" or im-
mediately f<;>rthcoming; and in some states, and some locations (e.g., 
outside the home), only if there is no available path of safe retreat. 3 
None of these requirements is absolute in the sense that the defendant 
must, in hindsight, be proved right to prevail on a self-defense claim; 
rather, each test is based on the perspective of a reasonable man (the 
old cases) or person (the newer ones) in the defendant's position at the 
time. The fact that the decedent's gun was in fact inoperative is thus 
beside the point if the defendant reasonably did not know that; the fact 
that there was an unknown, and largely unknowable, path of retreat is 
equally irrelevant ifthe defendant was unaware of this path of retreat.4 
In Gillespie's view, in a point she repeats often, these rules were 
designed to define "manly behavior."5 But that is not so, really. In 
many cases, the rules exist not so much to define manly behavior as to 
limit manly instincts - in order to preserve human life. 
It might be "manly" to respond to a slight or an insult with deadly 
force, but the requirement that the threat be one of death or serious 
bodily harm does not permit it. 6 Similarly, the imminence require-
ment is at least intended as a limit on vigilante revenge for attacks on 
(1961), 54 (1954), 63 (1959), making it all that much more difficult to discern the current state of 
the system. 
3. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW§ 5.7(b) (2d ed. 1986). 
4. See generally id. at § 5.7. 
5. See, e.g., p. 41. 
6. Thus, the law has served not simply to celebrate manly instincts, but to limit them. My 
favorite example of this is the successful campaign waged by the English judiciary in the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries against the honorable tradition of the duel. Although the 
"attitude of the law" was clear that killing in a duel was murder, accepting a challenge remained 
a matter of honor, and many juries would not convict. As one commentator put it: 
Some change in the public attitude towards duelling, coupled with the energy of judges in 
directing juries in strong terms, eventually brought about convictions, and it was not neces-
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one's family that occurred hours or days before. And the retreat re-
quirement is opposed by many precisely because it limits the manly 
instinct to stand one's ground and fight; it calls on men, and I think 
appropriately so, to sacrifice this aspect of manhood to the preserva-
tion of human life. 
This is not to say that the automatic, unthinking application of 
these requirements to fights between men and women, or husbands 
and wives in particular, does not raise potential problems. The effect 
of the rule disallowing deadly response where nondeadly force is 
threatened may be particularly harsh for women, for their alternatives 
may be more limited. To expect or demand that women, who are 
likely to be smaller and less adept with their fists than most men, re-
spond like schoolboys in the yard when attacked may be to leave them 
utterly without defenses. 
A similar problem arises in rape law, where the requirement of 
force has been defined according to a woman's response, and where 
her failure to "fight back" in traditional, schoolboy terms - to use her 
hands or her fists to resist an unarmed man - leads some courts to 
conclude that there must have been no force in the first instance. 7 But 
the answer, it seems to me, is a great deal easier in rape law: I have 
argued, as others have, that a woman should not be required to fight 
back with her hands and fists, that it should be enough if she says no, 
and that a man who proceeds in the face of such verbal resistance may 
fairly be held to have used force. 8 
The hard question in self-defense cases, however, is not whether it 
will suffice for a woman to use less force than her male attacker; it is 
whether she is privileged to use more, to use deadly force when he may 
not. It is easy to characterize the current rule as one written by men 
and for men. But what should the rule for women be? Should a wo-
man be privileged to respond to a fist with a gun? Cynthia Gillespie 
seems to say yes; indeed, she almost assumes it. But would she let a 
small, diminutive man do the same? Would she let a woman respond 
that way to the attack of her strong and aggressive sister? Should we? 
For me, at least, Gillespie's automatic response is not always so auto-
matic; it requires careful consideration of the individual woman and 
the individual facts.9 
sary to hang many gentlemen of quality before the understanding became general that duel· 
ling was not required by the code of honor. 
Williams, Consent and Public Policy, 1962 CRIM. L. REV. 74, 77. 
7. See, e.g., State v. Alston, 310 N.C. 399, 407-09, 312 S.E.2d 470 (1984) (holding that resist· 
ance is not required to demonstrate nonconsent, but that in the absence of resistance, or of weap· 
ons, no "force" can be shown); Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 345 Pa. Super. 269, 498 A.2d 395 
(1985) (holding that "forcible compulsion" required "physical compulsion or violence"). 
8. See S. EsTRICH, REAL RAPE 92-104 (1987). 
9. In this sense, while women may kill their abusive partners "as women,'' see MacKinnon, 
Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence (Book Review), 34 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1982), they also kill as 
individuals. Ignoring womanhood in favor of some standard of "reasonable personhood" is 
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Similar problems arise with respect to the imminence requirement. 
Traditional self-defense doctrine allows a woman to respond with 
deadly force in the face of a serious beating by her husband. But tradi-
tional self-defense doctrine does not allow her to respond eight hours 
later, or when he is asleep, or as he is walking out of the house. Gilles-
pie acknowledges that "many self-defense killings by battered women 
... take place when the man is sleeping, or when his back is turned, or 
by a shot through a door that he is threatening to break down" (p. 69). 
Imminence may not prove a problem when he is threatening the door, 
but it surely does when he is asleep. In Gillespie's view, the law -
and not the woman's response - is the problem: 
The battered woman learns from her experience that there is nothing, 
literally nothing, she can do to stop a beating after it has begun and that 
struggling or fighting back will likely only make his assault more furious. 
Helpless, her only option is to take what measures she can to minimize 
the damage and endure the beating until her assailant decides to stop. It 
is small wonder that such a woman, knowing that another beating is 
inevitable and that she will be helpless to defend herself against it once it 
has begun, may seek, or seize, an opportunity to defend herself that will 
have some chance of success. [p. 69] 
But shooting a man in the head after he has gone to bed (the story 
Gillespie uses to illustrate this point) (p. 70) is not simply a means of 
defense "that will have some chance of success" - it is a sure means 
of killing him. And women who arm themselves and succeed in kill-
ing their husbands are, by definition, hardly the "helpless" creatures of 
Gillespie's portrait. 10 Is it so wrong at least to ask whether alterna-
tives were available? Is it unreasonable to expect that where death or 
serious bodily harm is not imminent, a woman be required to explain 
why she did not resort to such alternatives before she resorts to armed 
violence? 
Gillespie reserves perhaps her most scathing criticism for the re-
treat requirement. In fact, a majority of American jurisdictions now 
hold that the defender need not retreat. Even in the minority that 
require retreat, however, a defender is not required to retreat when 
attacked in his or her home unless (in a few jurisdictions) the attacker 
is a co-occupant of the house. 11 According to Gillespie, for many wo-
men who have killed in self-defense 
the difference between having committed a serious crime and having 
committed no crime at all revolved around the absurd and totally irrele-
plainly wrong, see State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977) (reversing conviction 
of woman convicted of murdering alleged child-abuser where instructions called for application 
of a reasonableness standard in masculine terms), but the judgment required is not of all women 
as women, but of this individual woman - of her state of mind and her circumstances. It is the 
absence of individualization that supports a feminist critique of self-defense standards as much, 
or more, as the misapplication of categorical standards. 
10. See MacKinnon, supra note 9, at 729. 
11. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 3, at§ 5.7(f). 
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vant question of who had a right to be on the premises and not whether 
the woman was in fact acting to defend herself. Even more absurd, there 
is no way in the world any one of these women could possibly have 
known that the law of self-defense was different for her than 
1
for other 
people because of the legal technicalities of her marital status or living 
arrangements. It is hard to imagine that any system of criminal law 
could really expect that a woman who is facing a homicidal assault by a 
violent man - desperately seeking to save herself - will stop to analyze 
their comparative claims to the property and then conclude - despite 
his knife or his gun or his hands around her throat - that she is legally 
obligated to try escaping from him; and thus, although there is a weapon 
at hand, which she could use to defend herself, she should not chose to 
use it. Unfortunately, however, in many states, that scenario is exactly 
what our law requires. [p. 87] 
In fact, the rule Gillespie attacks is applied only in a minority of a 
minority of jurisdictions.12 Moreover, the retreat requirement, even at 
its broadest, is not necessarily an "absurd and irrelevant inquiry." 
The question, in the minority of jurisdictions that require retreat, is a 
factual one: Is there an avenue available, with "complete safety," 
which would allow the individual to avoid the use of deadly force?13 
Obviously not, when the man's hands are around her neck, or the gun 
is pointed at her head - but I have never seen a court require retreat 
in those circumstances. Still, where there is a safe avenue of retreat 
available, where a life - even of a bad person - could be spared, I for 
one think that avenue should be taken; indeed, it seems to me that 
only deference to "manly instincts" supports what is considered the 
"less civilized" view.14 
There is, finally, the problem of defining the reasonable person. It 
is not enough that a defender hone8tly believes that she is in imminent 
danger of death or seriously bodily harm, and (where applicable) that 
no avenue of retreat is available. These beliefs must not only be hon-
estly held, they must be "reasonable." 
The problem here, as always in the criminal law, is striking the 
balance between the defender's subjective perceptions and those of the 
hypothetical reasonable person. To apply a purely objective standard 
is unduly harsh because it ignores the characteristics which inevitably 
and justifiably shape the defender's perspective, thus holding him (or 
her) to a standard he simply cannot meet. If the defender is young or 
crippled or blind, we should not expect him to behave like a strapping, 
12. See id. at § 5.7(f) & n.62. 
13. See, e.g., State v. Abbott, 36 N.J. 63, 72, 174 A.2d 881, 885 (1961) (quoting the Model 
Penal Code approach that the use of deadly force is not justified when "the actor knows that he 
can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating"). 
,14. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scarr, supra note 3, at§ 5.7(f) (terming the retreat requirement 
"a more civilized view"); 2 P. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 131(c)(4) (1984) ("It 
merely states the obvious conclusion that, ifthe actor may retreat in complete safety, then the use 
of defensive force is not necessary."). 
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sighted adult. On the other hand, if the reasonable person has all of 
the defender's characteristics, the standard loses any normative com-
ponent and becomes entirely subjective. Applying a purely subjective 
standard in all cases would give free rein to the short-tempered, the 
pugnacious, and the foolhardy who see threats of harm where the rest 
of us would not and who blind themselves to opportunities for escape 
that seem plainly available. These unreasonable people may not be as 
wicked as (although perhaps more dangerous than) cold-blooded mur-
derers - imperfect self-defense generally reduces murder tq man-
slaughter - but neither are they, in practical or legal terms, justified 
in causing death. 
As applied to the cases Gillespie presents, the question is whether 
the reasonable person is a woman of a certain age ·and height and 
weight - or a battered woman. In recent years, defense attorneys 
have enjoyed some success in arguing for the admission of expert evi-
dence of the "battered woman's syndrome,"15 a syndrome in which 
women are repeatedly abused by the dominant man in their lives, gen-
erally in cycles of three phases: the tension-building stage, the acute 
battering incident, and the contrition phase.16 The cycles explain why 
some women don't leave: the loving behavior of the third phase may 
affirm their hopes and strip them of their will. For many others, the 
cycles result in a state of passivity and paralysis which, coupled with 
economic dependence and the absence of external supports, traps them 
inside the relationship; indeed, the battering may itself be understood 
as a means of preventing separation, 17 and may even increase if and 
when the woman does leave her partner.18 
At a minimum, such evidence is relevant to the woman's credibil-
ity as a witness: it provides corroboration for a story which many 
jurors might otherwise find, literally, incredible. In State v. Kelly, 19 
15. See Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-De-
fense, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 121 (1985); Schneider, Equal Righ~ to Trial for W-0men: Sex Bias 
in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 623 (1980); Schneider & Jordan, Repre-
sentatiim of Women Who Defend Themselves in Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 Wo-
MEN's RTS. L. REP. 149 (1978). 
In addition to the relevance question discussed in the text. that follows, controversy also exists 
as to the scientific reliability of evidence of a battered women's syndrome. Compare, e.g., State v. 
Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984) (accepting such evidence as reliable) with lbn-Tamas v. 
United States, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. App. 1983) (upholding the exclusion of such evidence). 
16. See generally R. LANGLEY & R. LEVY, WIFE BEATING: THE SILENT CRISIS 112-14 
(1977); M. PAGELOW, WOMAN-BATIERING (1981); L. WALKER, THE BATIERED WOMAN 55-
70 (1979); L. WALKER, THE BATIERED WOMAN SYNORO~E (1984). 
17. See Mahoney, Law and Racial Geography: Public Housing and the Economy in New 
Orleans, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1251 (forthcoming 1990). 
18. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE~ REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JurncE 21 (1983) 
(finding that three quarters of domestic assaults occur while victims are separated or divorced 
from their assailants). These women may also be among those most willing to report instances of 
domestic assault. · 
19. 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984). 
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for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that such ex-
pert testimony should be admissible at least to aid the jury in under-
standing the threshold question of why the woman did not leave, a 
question which - while not an element of the self-defense claim -
would vitally affect her credibility as a witness. Such testimony is also 
clearly relevant to the question of what this woman did in fact believe: 
Did she believe that she was in imminent danger of death or serious 
bodily harm? Is she, in other words, not simply telling the truth in 
general, but telling the truth about that? The hard, and far more sig-
nificant, question is whether such evidence is also relevant to and pro-
bative of the determination of the "reasonableness" of that belief.20 
In this context, "reasonableness" can have two possible meanings. 
First, a woman's choice may be "reasonable," even if it conflicts with 
our own (or a mythical other's) assessment of the situation, if the wo-
man is indeed right, or probably right, or at least more likely right 
than us, in her assessment. To the extent that her experience as a 
battered woman, and the syndrome from which she suffers, makes her 
a better judge than us of the seriousness of the situation she actually 
faces, there should be no question that such evidence is not only rele-
vant, but also highly probative. 
Thus, the man's past history of abusive violence against this wo-
man is highly relevant, and that is so under the black letter of the 
criminal law, without regard to battered woman's syndrome.21 The 
special knowledge - of the expert and of the woman herself - of the 
cycles of domestic violence can be understood as casting additional 
and needed light on this rather well-established form of inquiry. Does 
the woman know something we don't about the risk she faces? Does 
she, and her expert, foresee that a serious beating is imminent where 
you and I would simply not recognize the danger? If the answer is 
yes, then the jury should know it as well, and take it into account; 
reasonableness is not an invitation to blind ourselves to particular real-
ities of the situation in favor of normative standards that simply are 
not applicable. The law does not apply an absolute necessity standard 
because to do so would be too harsh, not too lenient. Surely if we can 
be convinced that the woman is right, or even probably right, then 
how can her belief not be reasonable? 
And one need go no further than this to resolve many of the cases 
which Gillespie poses. Where the woman is indeed in a better position 
20. See Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem 
of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195, 211-20 (1986) (arguing that 
"[t]he jury needs expert testimony on reasonableness precisely because the jury may not under-
stand that the battered woman's prediction of the likely extent and imminence of violence is 
particularly acute and accurate"). 
21. See e.g., State v. Dunning, 8 Wash. App. 340, 342, 506 P.2d 321, 322 (1973) ("seeing 
what he sees and knowing what he knows"); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 817-18 (N.D. 
1983). 
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to know, where her belief is grounded in the reality of the situation, 
nothing in the law even as currently. written requires or supports a 
judge's or jury's decision to ignore that reality in favor of a gentler one 
of its own choosing. One need not abandon imminence or threat or 
even retreat to understand that such cases are indeed traditional cases 
of self-defense, subject to the same requirements as any other self-de-
fense case, properly applied to these individual facts. 
But what of the woman who shoots her husband while he is sound 
asleep, and not, by anyone's account, about to do anything? What of 
the woman who faces a beating, but not - even within her own or her 
expert's description of the cycles of violence - serious bodily harm? 
Put aside the woman who has tried to escape in the past and been 
beaten for it, or who has called the police and been rebuffed, or who 
would be leaving her young children defenseless if she left. In these 
cases, properly applied, the retreat requirement cannot be met with the 
necessary "complete safety." But what of the woman who has never 
tried any of these alternatives? What of the woman who could walk 
out the back door and into a neighbor's house? 
In such cases, the "reasonableness" inquiry, and the evidence of 
battered woman's syndrome, does not really go to the rightness of the 
woman's belief in the need for deadly force. It is, instead, a request to 
abandon the limits on self-defense out of empathy for the circum-
stances of the defender and disgust for the acts of her abuser. We can 
find her belief in the imminence of danger "reasonable" only by decid-
ing that these standards mean less in the home than outside it, mean 
less when applied to cruel husbands who torment defenseless wives 
than to others. 
On its face, that is a very uncomfortable request - at least for 
those of us who see in the rules of self-defense a laudable recognition 
of the value of human life and a desirable effort to articulate a norma-
tive standard which protects even aggressors and wrongdoers from in-
stant execution or vigilante justice. The unfairness, as I see it, is not 
that such women may be punished for "overreacting," but that Bern-
hard Goetz - a white, male New York subway rider - does so much 
worse, ignores the rules so much more blatantly, and is exculpated for 
it.22 In theory, vigilante men are not acting in self-defense; yet in prac-
tice, they seem to fare much better before juries and grand juries. 
Recently, Todd Alan Broom used deadly force after seeing another 
man kill a woman in a Texas shopping mall parking lot. There was no 
evidence that Broom, who became known as "the shopping mall vigi-
22. Sullivan, Goetz is Given One-Year Term on Gun Charge, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1989, at 1, 
col. l; Gross, Public's Response to the Jury's Decision: Divided and Deep-Seated Opinions, N.Y. 
Times, June 18, 1987, at B6, col. 1. See generally G. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF DEFENSE: 
BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL (1988); L. RUBIN, QUIET RAGE: BERNIE GOETZ 
IN A TIME OF MADNESS (1986); Carter, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 91 YALE L.J. 420 
(1988). 
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lante," was in any imminent danger; but plainly, he was moved by 
what he had seen and the man he killed was himself a murderer (or at 
least an alleged murderer). I am certain that some of the women in 
Cynthia Gillespie's book feel even greater anger after they have been 
beaten themselves, or after they see their husbands beat not a stranger, 
but their own children. And I have no doubt that some of these hus-
bands and fathers are far more worthy of our hatred and disgust even 
than the killer who shot his ex-girlfriend in the Texas parking lot, let 
alone the black teenagers whom Goetz shot on the subway. 
The grand jury in Texas decided not to indict, and the chief prose-
cutor, while saying that as a law enforcement officer, he believed 
charges should be levied, emphasized that as a person, he certainly 
understood why the man had acted as he did, and why the grand jury 
did not indict. Broom's attorney was quoted as saying: "We feel that 
equity prevailed in this case, and sometimes you have to temper the 
law with equity in order to arrive at the just result."23 
One can of course argue that the grand jury in Texas and the 
Goetz jury in New York were simply "wrong" - and even that the 
cases might have come out differently in the end had they been han-
dled differently in the beginning (and certainly, in New York, had ra-
cism not entered into it). Ultimately, however, the empathy 
component of the criminal law is, for better or worse, both essential 
and inevitable. The criminal law is after all an expression of commu-
nity standards - sometimes for better and sometimes for worse. lt 
can be enforced only where the community - at least as expressed by 
prosecutors who are politically accountable to it, and jurors who are in 
theory representative of it - is willing to stand behind it. 
The question, then, is not whether there will be empathy, but who 
will benefit from it. The usual answer is "people like us" - people 
with whom we identify, people whose shoes we can imagine wearing, 
people whose frustrations we share, people like Bernhard Goetz or 
even Todd Alan Broom. 
The irony is that, statistically at least, battered women are more 
"like us" than most of us would care to acknowledge. If you believe 
the studies, as many as a third of the relationships between men and 
women involve violence of some kind. 24 To be sure, in the overwhelm-
ing majority of these, the women do not kill; battered women who kill 
23. See Texas Grand Jury Refuses to Indict Man Who Killed Fleeing Murderer, L.A. Times, 
Mar. 29, 1990, at A24, col. 1. 
24. Constructing an accurate statistical picture is difficult given the reluctance of both batter-
ers and victims to admit the problem. The National Center on Women and Family Law esti-
mates that battery occurs in 24-30% of marriages. See NATIONAL CENTER ON WOMEN AND 
FAMILY LAW, WOMAN BATIERING: THE FACTS 3 (1989). In 1975 and 1985 surveys, Murray 
Straus and Richard Gelles found that 11-12% of American men were physically violent toward 
female partners. See id. at 20; R. GELLES & M. STRAUS, INTIMATE VIOLENCE (1988); M. 
STRAUS, R. GELLES & S. STEINMETZ, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN 
FAMILY (1980). A federal study in San Francisco of women who had been previously married 
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are the exception among battered women, the ones whose aggression, 
or desperation, or instability25 leads them to reject or abandon the pas-
sivity which is itself the hallmark of the syndrome. Of course, the 
same is true of subway riders, and mall shoppers; most of us put up 
with the thugs, accept the muggings, surrender when faced with a de-
mand for money. When Bernhard Goetz shoots his muggers, we ap-
plaud (or at least acquit) him; when Todd Alan Broom shoots a 
woman-abuser, we exonerate him; but when Caroline Scott or Delores 
Churchill kill their abusive husbands, we condemn them. Whatever 
the statistics tell us about actual experience, more of us seem ready to 
identify and empathize actively as subway riders and mugging victims 
than as "battered women," just as more of us are willing to admit that 
we have been robbed than that we have been raped. 
I am not ready to abandon the requirements of self-defense because 
empathy is not always evenly applied; if I cannot always control juries 
with "the law," that is for me all the more reason to try to guide them 
with it. But I am not averse to trying to even the scales of injustice a 
bit. Admitting evidence of past batterings and expert testimony of 
battered womah's syndrome may not move us to try walking in that 
woman's shoes, but at least it tells us more about the person we are 
judging. It does not enforce empathy, but it may help us climb the 
barriers and traverse the distance that we place between ourselves and 
the victims of domestic and sexual abuse. 
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mony and the Law of Self-Defense, 62 IND. L.J. 1253, 1276-77 (1987) (arguing that battered 
wives "tend to be 'generally more maladjusted, with higher scores on psychosis, personality dis-
order, and neurosis factors' • . . . The danger is that what mental health experts define as a 
'reasonable' survival skill developed by the battered woman is not 'reasonable' in the legal 
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